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DUBAI PORTS WORLD UNDER EXON-FLORIO: A 
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY OR A TEMPEST IN A 
SEAPORT? 
Deborah M. Mostaghel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In January and February of 2006, Congress and the public played 
a variation of the game "Which of these things does not belong?" 
This variation instead asked "Which of these transactions does not 
belong?" The list included a Singaporean company taking over a 
. U.S. telecommunications business,l a Dutch company acquiring a 
U.S. semiconductor company,2 a German company buying a U.S. 
telecommunications provider,3 a Chinese company acquiring a U.S. 
personal computer business,4 and a United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) 
company named Dubai Ports World (DP World) acquiring rights to 
run terminal operations at six U.S. ports.5 The answer seemed 
obvious. The DP World transaction did not belong. 
Congresspersons of both parties vociferously opposed this 
transaction, causing the Executive Branch, which had championed 
it, to withdraw its support. This Article examines the debacle of the 
DP World transaction, in light of the statute and regulations that 
govern foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets, to see if the brouhaha was 
* Director of Legal Research and Writing, The University of Toledo College of Law; J.D. 1988, 
University of Utah College of Law. 
1 E.g., Dennis K. Berman, The Economy: Bush Is Expected to Approve Global Crossing 
Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at A2 (discussing Singapore Technologies Telemedia's 
acquisition of Global Crossing). 
2 Press Release, ASML, ASM Lithography and Silicon Valley Group Receive CFIUS 
Approval to Proceed with Merger (May 3, 2001), http://asml.comlasmldotcoml 
show.do?ctx=5869&rid=982. 
3 E.g., Technology Briefing Telecommunications: Wireless Deal Heads for Finish Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 2, 2001, at C4 (addressing Deutsche Telekom's nearing acquisition of 
VoiceStream Wireless). 
4 Anthony Michael Sabino, Transactions That Imperil National Security: A Look at the 
Government's Power to Say "No," 77 N.Y. ST. B.J. 20, 20 (2005) (noting that "IBM proposed to 
sell its personal computer business to Lenovo Group Ltd., the largest personal computer 
maker in the People's Republic of China"). 
5 For a full discussion, see infra Parts VI.B, VII.A.2. 
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warranted. It concludes that the statute and its implementing 
regulations protect U.S. national security and that the reaction to 
the DP World transaction was a tempest in a seaport. 
As a result of ever-increasing foreign investment in the United 
States, Congress created a mechanism to review transactions in 
which foreign companies seek to acquire U.S. companies. This is 
the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Trade Act).6 Under Exon-Florio, 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS), which is composed of representatives of twelve U.S. 
government agencies and departments, may review proposed 
transactions to see if they pose a threat to national security. 7 If 
CFIUS believes a transaction does pose such a threat, it 
recommends that the President take action.8 The President has the 
power to block a contemplated acquisition or to order divestment of 
a transaction already completed. 9 From the beginning, 
implementation of Exon-Florio has resulted in pitting the goal of 
"[s]purring the U.S. [e]conomy"l0 against the goal of enforcing 
national security.!1 
Part II of this Article discusses foreign investment in the United 
States as background for understanding passage of Exon-Florio in 
1988. Part III discusses how Exon-Florio works. Part IV discuses 
two transactions that prompted calls for revision of Exon-Florio, 
culminating in the passage of the Byrd Amendment (Byrd). Part V 
discusses the passing of Byrd in 1993. Byrd's changes remain in 
effect today. 
Part VI discusses economic and political concerns as they affect 
transactions subject to Exon-Florio review. If there is a fly in the 
Exon-Florio ointment, it is the intrusion of economic and political 
protectionism during CFIUS review or thereafter. The proposed 
6 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1426 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170 (2000». 
7 EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 34-35 (2006). 
8 Id. at 35-36, 40. 
9 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d). 
\0 Ellison F. McCoy, The Reauthorization of Exon-Florio: A Battle Between Spurring the 
U.S. Economy and Protecting National Security, 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 685, 685 (1992). 
11 See, e.g., Jim Mendenhall, United States: Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions 
Under the Exon-Florio Amendment-The MAMCO Divestiture, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 286, 286 
(1991); Patrick L. Schmidt, The Exon-Florio Statute: How It Affects Foreign Investors and 
Lenders in the United States, 27 INTL LAW. 795, 800-02 (1993); Cecelia M. Waldeck, 
Proposals for Limiting Foreign Investment Risk Under the Exon-Florio Amendment, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1211 (1991). 
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acquisition of Unocal in 2005 by a subsidiary of the state-owned 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was derailed by 
a combination of political and economic protectionism. This kind of 
protectionism is further complicated by the national preoccupation 
with terrorism. DP World, a company owned by the government of 
the United Arab Emirates, wanted to acquire Peninsular and 
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), a U.K. company that 
ran terminal operations at six U.S. ports.l2 The acquisition passed 
CFIUS review.l3 The transaction ultimately failed, however, 
because of the enormous political backlash that followed the 
announcement of the deal.14 While the politicizing of decision-
making is often decried, CNOOC and DP World present textbook 
cases where this happened. 
Part VII examines the implications of the CNOOC and DP World 
transactions. As a result of the CNOOC transaction, some in 
Congress called for changes to Exon-Florio by demanding more 
reviews in a more public manner, focusing more specifically on 
economic protection.l5 The DP World deal also generated criticism 
of Exon-Florio that focused, predictably, on the ownership of the 
acquiring company. This section concludes that Exon-Florio does 
not need to be changed. It functions as it was intended. Executive 
review of mergers and acquisitions examines transactions that may 
implicate national security. Economic welfare is protected as a 
byproduct of protecting national security. The process was designed 
not to be open because of the sensitive nature of the information 
involved in mergers and acquisitions. The statute already 
mandates that review be carried out in any transaction where a 
foreign government has a controlling interest in the acquiring 
company.l6 
Political quarterbacking should not subvert the CFIUS review 
process. The statute provides for information sharing with 
Congress. 17 Congress should fight against blindly espousing 
economic protectionism. Two views of national security motivate 
economic protectionism. One is the historically entrenched view 
that national security is synonymous with economic security.l8 The 
12 See infra Part VI.B. 
13 See infra Part VI.B. 
14 See infra Part VI.B. 
15 See infra Part VII.A.I. 
16 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000). 
17 See id. § 2170(g). 
18 See infra Part VILA. 
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other is the more recent but emotionally powerful drive to make 
terrorism the only lens through which to view national security.19 
Revising Exon-Florio based on these views is a mistake. First, a 
revision does not necessarily protect us. Further, such revision does 
not consider the realities of our increasingly global economy. In 
today's economy, focusing on narrow views of economic and political 
security can have serious repercussions for the review process, 
foreign companies seeking to invest in the United States, U.S. 
companies seeking foreign investment partners, the U.S. economy 
itself, and for our reputation and relationships with the world as a 
whole. 
Part VIII concludes that CFIUS review need not be changed. 
CFIUS must follow its own rules properly, and Congress must play 
its behind-the-scenes role without political grandstanding. If these 
recommendations are followed, CFIUS reviews will continue to 
protect the national economy and security. 
II. BACKGROUND-FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Foreign investment has played an important role in our economy 
since the nation's inception. Even though foreign investment has 
always been seen as necessary, foreign imports have often been 
perceived as a threat to the U.S. economy. The stock market crash 
of 1929 led to the passage of the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 
(Tariff Act), which "set some of the highest rates of tariff duties in 
the history of the United States."20 In 1934, Congress amended the 
Tariff Act to authorize the President, for a period of three years, to 
enter into trade agreements with foreign nations.21 The focus under 
the early Act was on economic protection. For example, section 307 
of the Tariff Act was enacted "'to protect domestic producers, 
production, and workers from the unfair competition which would 
19 See infra Part VII.B. 
20 RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, 
TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 229 (2005). The Smoot Hawley Act was 
the last piece of tariff legislation that Congress passed without international 
negotiations .... 
Since 1930, changes in the levels of tariffs applicable to goods entering the United 
States have chiefly been achieved through international trade agreements negotiated by 
the President and affirmed by Congress. During the 1930s and 40s, the Smoot-Hawley 
tariffs generally applied unless altered through bilateral trade agreements. The 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 gives the President the authority to enter into 
such agreements, and under various extensions this authority remains in effect today. 
[d. (footnote omitted). 
21 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943, 944. 
2007] Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio 587 
result from the importation of foreign products produced by forced 
labor."'22 
The focus widened over time to include national security. The 
President's authorization to enter into trade agreements was 
extended into the 1950s through various trade and tariff acts, so 
long as the President's decisions considered national security.23 The 
1954 extension, however, was treated differently than the previous 
ones. It enabled the President to intervene in trade agreements if 
the foreign investment would threaten national security not only 
directly but also by depressing "domestic production needed for 
projected national defense requirements."24 The extensions of trade 
and tariff legislation throughout the later 1950s continued to give 
the President authority to limit imports when the President 
believed that these imports would damage national security through 
curtailing industries vital to the national defense.25 The Trade 
Agreements Extension Act of 1958 obligated the Executive to 
comply whenever a government department or other interested 
party requested an investigation.26 If a trade transaction was found 
to pose a threat to national security, the President may take action 
to adjust imports "'to a level that will not threaten to impair the 
national security."'27 
The acts of the 1930s through the 1950s generally pertained to 
products imported into the United States. At first the focus was on 
the effect of imports on the domestic economy. Later, it included the 
ability of the domestic economy to meet defense needs. The Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 (1962 Trade Act) brought these two strands 
together, enunciating the philosophy that the Executive "shall 
'recognize the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to 
our national security, and shall take into consideration the impact 
of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual 
domestic industries."'28 This Act was considered necessary because 
22 Hilary K. Josephs, Upstairs, Trade Law; Downstairs, Labor Law, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. 
REV. 849, 854 n.16 (2001) (quoting McKinney v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544, 1552 
(Fed. Cir. 1986». 
23 Edward E. Groves, Note, A Brief History of the 1988 National Security Amendments, 20 
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 589, 590 & n.6 (1989) (referencing legislative history from the 1930s 
through the 1950s in which presidential power to enter trade agreements was extended). 
24 Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 See id. 
26 Pub. L. No. 85·686, 72 Stat. 673, 678 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 
U.S.C.). 
27 Groves, supra note 23, at 590 (quoting Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, Pub. L. 
No. 84·86, ch. 169, 69 Stat. 162, 166 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.». 
28 Groves, supra note 23, at 591 (quoting Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87·794, 
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the amount of foreign funds invested in the United States had 
nearly doubled 1950s levels.29 The Act maintained the Executive's 
obligation to investigate, vesting it in the Director of the Office of 
Emergency Planning. 30 The investigative function was later 
transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury.3! Investigations 
continued to be triggered in response to requests from heads of 
government departments or other interested parties-principally 
individual domestic industries. 
Some in Congress had feared that the voluntary nature of the 
investigative process would result in overwhelming numbers of U.S. 
industries requesting investigations.32 Such numbers did not 
materialize. From 1962 to 1986, private industry requests for 
investigations came from manufacturers of metal alloys and refined 
metals, miniature and precision instruments makers, and makers of 
metal cutting and metal forming machine tools. 33 These 
investigations were either terminated at a company's request or 
because the import was not deemed to threaten national security.34 
Whereas investigations triggered by private industry requests did 
not generally garner protection under the Act, investigations 
triggered by government requests produced a different outcome. 
Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan responded to 
government initiated investigations by imposing controls over the 
import of oil. 35 All four Presidents perceived the need for foreign oil 
by the United States as a potential national security problem.36 
In the 1970s, partly as a result of "the depreciation of the dollar 
against other major foreign currencies," foreign investment 
continued to pour into the United States.37 In response, Congress 
passed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, requiring the 
Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce to conduct a comprehensive 
§ 232(c), 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d) (2000»). 
29 Paul I. Djurisic, Comment, The Exon·Florio Amendment: National Security Legislation 
Hampered by Political and Economic Forces, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 179, 181 & n.21 (1991). 
30 See 1962 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 87·794, § 232(b), 76 Stat. 872, 877 (codified as amended 
at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b». 
31 President Nixon adopted a Reorganization Plan that transferred responsibility from the 
Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness to the Secretary of the Treasury. See Exec. 
Order No. 11,725, 3A C.F.R. 190 (1973). 
32 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 85·1838 (1958), as reprinted in 1958 u.S.C.C.A.N. 3609, 3630-31. 
33 Groves, supra note 23, at 593 n.29. 
34 Id. at 593. 
35 Id. at 593-94 nn.30-33. 
36 See id. 
37 Djurisic, supra note 29, at 182 n.27. 
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review of foreign investment in the United States.38 This review led 
to the conclusion that the United States lacked a coherent 
mechanism to monitor foreign investment. In response, President 
Ford created CFIUS, charged with "primary continuing 
responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the 
impact of foreign investment in the United States ... and for 
coordinating the implementation of United States policy on such 
investment."39 
Despite the apparent solemnity of the charge to monitor and 
coordinate foreign investment policy, CFIUS had little actual 
authority to prohibit or even restrict foreign investment that raised 
security concerns. Under President Ford, CFIUS existed as just 
another committee.40 In contrast, foreign investment in the United 
States increased dramatically under President Reagan.41 
During the 1980s, foreign capital played a major role in mergers 
and acquisitions in the American business sector.42 Proponents of 
foreign direct investment argued that the U.S. economy had always 
welcomed foreign investment and that free trade (including the free 
flow of investment) was good for countries on either end of the 
flow. 43 
Opponents of unbridled foreign investment feared a host of 
economic and political consequences "cast in terms of national 
security, labor relations, micro- and macroeconomic consequences, 
anticompetitive effects, or foreign political control."44 For example, 
if a foreign owner acquired a U.S. defense contractor, then 
confidential information might have been at risk. 45 If a foreign 
38 Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450, 1450 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000». 
39 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3A C.F.R. 160 (1975), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78b note (2000). 
40 See Djurisic, supra note 29, at 182-83. 
41 Foreign direct investment in the United States was $83 billion in 1980, and by 1989, it 
had reached approximately $408 billion. Id. at 183. 
42 See generally Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
International Economic Policy and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Congo 54-
111 (1988) (statement of Elliott L. Richardson, Chairman, Association for Foreign Investment 
in America) (discussing the extent to which foreign direct investment has benefited U.S. 
industry). 
43 E.g., James A. Lewis, New Objectives for CFIUS: Foreign Ownership, Critical 
Infrastructure, and Communications Interception, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 460-61 (2005). 
"American foreign policy for more than a century has encouraged an open, international 
economy and the removal of restrictions to trade and foreign investment .... The United 
States routinely seeks bilateral and multilateral investment trade agreements to promote free 
trade." Id. 
44 Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States Investment Obligations in 
Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1989). 
45 Id. 
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owner was located in states with low wages, then collective 
bargaining may become difficult.46 
Eventually, public opinion turned against the influx of foreign 
capital. The American public increasingly believed that their 
country was being sold off piece by piece to foreign interests. A few 
headlines of the period make the point: "For Sale: America,"47 "Brits 
Buy Up the Ad Business,"48 and "Japan Goes Hollywood."49 
Congress was becoming increasingly concerned that CFIUS lacked 
authority to control foreign takeovers deemed risky to national 
security. Major catalysts for alarm were the 1986 attempts by the 
corporate raider Sir James Goldsmith to take over Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber (Goodyear) and by the Japanese company Fujitsu to 
take over Fairchild Semiconductor (Fairchild).50 
Goodyear, founded in Akron, Ohio in 1898, had been one of the 
world's largest tire makers since 1916.51 British financier Sir James 
Goldsmith tried to take over the company in 1986 with a $5 billion 
hostile bid. 52 To fight off this bid, Goodyear sold the company's non-
tire businesses and borrowed heavily. 53 Goodyear succeeded in 
retaining control of the company, but at a cost of $90 million in 
greenmail54 to Goldsmith and, according to some, the "abandonment 
of its long-term corporate strategy."55 Goodyear's publicity 
campaign against the attack on a "treasured midwestern 
'institution"'56 helped set the stage for legislation to slow foreign 
investment. 
In a similar vein, Fairchild, characterized as "the 'mother 
company' of Silicon ValleY,"57 was a leader in the semiconductor 
industry. The potential takeover of this company, at the forefront of 
an industry considered vital in both the consumer computer chip 
46 Id. at 6. 
47 Stephen Koepp, For Sale: America; From Manhattan's High·Rises to Oregon's Forests, 
the Big Buyout Is On, TIME, Sept. 14, 1987, at 52. 
48 Randall Rothenberg, Brits Buy up the Ad Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1989, § 6, at 614. 
49 John Schwartz et aI., Japan Goes Hollywood, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1989, at 62 (addressing 
Sony's proposed acquisition of Columbia Pictures). 
50 Alvarez, supra note 44, at 56. 
51 Posting of Don Iannone to http://www.don-iannone.com/edfutures/2006101lcorporate-
history-goodyear-tire-rubber.html (Jan. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Iannone]. 
52 Alvarez, supra note 44, at 56-57. 
53 Iannone, supra note 51. 
54 In a hostile takeover, the target company may employ greenmail as a defense to the 
takeover. The target company repurchases the hostile "bidder's shares at a premium." ALAN 
R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 574 (4th ed. 2003). 
55 Alvarez, supra note 44, at 57. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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market and the high-tech weapons market, raised red flags that 
Japan might corner the market on semiconductor technology58 and 
"that existing statutory mechanisms could not adequately protect 
sensitive industries from military and economic competitors."59 As 
it turned out, Fujitsu abandoned the attempt in light of the political 
pressure brought to bear on it. This political pressure was the 
result of an "'ideological brawl'" between those who espoused free 
trade and those who wanted to protect American industry.6o The 
brawl spread to "U.S. government officials at Commerce, Defense, 
State, USTR, Justice, Treasury, and the White House."61 The 
"'techno-hawks"'62 argued "a domino theory that the Japanese would 
take over the industry and U.S. companies would eventually only 
market and distribute Japanese products."63 The "'free traders"'64 
saw the national security arguments as a "'smokescreen' for 'Japan-
bashing"'65 and argued that the sale would help Fairchild, in 
particular, and U.S. competition and competitiveness in genera1.66 
The common conclusion between these two factions was that 
existing law could not block the transaction unless the sale violated 
the antitrust laws or unless the President declared a national 
emergency.67 
Ultimately, the Fairchild deal was not consummated.68 Based on 
his belief that the Goodyear and Fairchild transactions posed a 
threat to national security, Senator Exon proposed an amendment 
to the Technology Competitiveness Act, which was being considered 
at the time. The proposed amendment granted the President 
discretionary authority to limit various types of foreign investment 
initiatives should they be perceived to threaten national security or 
necessary U.S. commerce.69 Representative J. Florio had introduced 
58 Susan W. Liebeler & William H. Lash III, Exon·Florio Harbinger of Economic 
Nationalism?, CATO REV. BuS. & GOV'T, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulationlreg16n1d.html 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2006). 
59 Christopher R. Fenton, Note, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-
September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
195, 202 (2002). 
60 Alvarez, supra note 44, at 58 (quoting Donna K.H. Walters, The Fairchild Deal Trade 
War: When Chips Were Down, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 1). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. (quoting Walters, supra note 60, at 1). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 59. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 62. For a discussion of why and the resulting effects, see id. at 61-63. 
69 See id. at 63. 
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a similar proposal in the House. 7o These proposals were supported 
and attacked in line with the philosophies of the techno-hawks and 
the free traders.71 The Exon and Florio proposals were finally 
adopted as part of the 1988 Trade Act.72 Adoption of Exon-Florio 
was a direct response to congressional worries that the 1962 Trade 
Act did not protect national security from uncontrolled foreign 
investment in sensitive sectors of the American economy.73 
However, the scope of Senator Exon's initial proposal was limited in 
several ways between its initial appearance and its final 
incorporation into the 1988 Trade Act. 74 
One of several changes was that the final version of Exon-Florio 
afforded the President greater discretion in choosing which cases to 
investigate. Instead of requiring investigation into every "joint 
ventureD and licensing arrangementD,"75 the final version reached 
only more significant business dealings such as mergers and 
acquisitions. 76 In another change, the President could suspend an 
agreement leading to a merger, acquisition, or takeover only on a 
finding of "'credible evidence that ... the foreign interest exercising 
control might take action that threatens to impair the national 
security."'77 The standard, "threatens to impair the national 
security," which gives greater discretion to the President, is a looser 
standard than was the standard initially recommended by Senator 
Exon which specified the United States as the threatened party.78 
In a third change, the phrase "'national security and essential 
commerce'" was rejected. 79 In Exon -Florio as finally passed, the 
only consideration became "'national security."'8o 
National security is deliberately not defined in the statute. In 
commentary, the drafters explain that they deliberately did not 
include "either positive lists of products and services considered 
essential to the national security, or negative lists of areas that are 
70 Id. at 64 n.350. 
71 Id. at 64-68. 
72 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
73 See Alvarez, supra note 44, at 69 (noting that the critics of Exon-Florio did not recognize 
any existing law that authorized the President to prevent a foreign corporate takeover). 
74 See id. at 69-71,75-77. 
75 Id. at 70. 
76 See id. 
77 Fenton, supra note 59, at 204 (emphasis added) (quoting 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(1) 
(2000». 
78 See Alvarez, supra note 44, at 63. 
79 Fenton, supra note 59, at 204. 
80 Id. 
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not so considered."81 They also declined to "incorporate a multi-
factor test, based on a list of products and services the significance 
of which to the national security would depend on a number of other 
factors, such as the dollar value of the transaction, or the 
availability of the product or service from other U.S. suppliers."82 
The drafters rejected these lists and tests because "they could 
improperly curtail the President's broad authority to protect the 
national security, and, at the same time, not result in guidance 
sufficiently detailed to be helpful to parties."83 According to the 
drafters, in general, "transactions that involve products, services, 
and technologies that are important to U.S. national defense 
requirements will usually be deemed significant with respect to the 
national security."84 
These changes were necessary because President Reagan would 
have vetoed the 1988 Trade Act if it had contained Senator Exon's 
original proposals.85 Various Administration officials believed that 
"the proposal would chill foreign investment to the detriment of the 
U.S. economy, was unnecessary given existing laws, would increase 
uncertainty for the foreign investor, undermine U.S. efforts to 
eliminate investment barriers abroad, and invite retaliation against 
U.S. investors abroad."86 A Treasury Department representative 
testified that existing legislation was sufficient to regulate foreign 
direct investment.87 He expressed the Administration's worry that 
passage of Exon-Florio would lead to a public distrust for, and 
hindrance of, foreign investors.88 With the changes, President 
Reagan signed the legislation into law on August 23, 1988.89 The 
President designated CFIUS to be the body in charge of 
investigating transactions that could potentially create threats to 
national security.90 President Reagan's designee to CFIUS was the 
81 Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 56 




85 See Alvarez, supra note 44, at 74. 
86 Alvarez, supra note 44, at 64. For a discussion of other laws, see Harry L. Clark & 
Sanchitha Jayaram, Intensified International Trade and Security Policies Can Present 
Challenges for Corporate Transactions, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 391 (2005); Christopher F. 
Corr, A Survey of United States Controls on Foreign Investment and Operations: How Much Is 
Enough?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 417 (1994). 
87 See id. at 73 (addressing the testimony of Assistant Secretary for International Affairs 
at Treasury David C. Mulford). 
88 See id. 
89 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
90 Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988), reprinted as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78b 
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Treasury Department.91 
III. How THE EXON-FLORIO AMENDMENT WORKS 
With the passage of Exon-Florio in 1988, a foreign company that 
wants to acquire all or part of an interest in a U.S. company may 
find that the transaction will be reviewed by CFIUS. The Treasury 
Secretary is the Chair of CFIUS, which is composed of twelve 
Cabinet and Executive Branch heads in all. 92 The current members 
include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and 
Commerce; the Attorney General, representing the Justice 
Department; the National Security Advisor; the U.S. Trade 
Representative; the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy; 
and representatives from the Office of Management and Budget, the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers, and the Office of Science 
and Technology.93 The Chair may invite representatives from other 
agencies as appropriate.94 CFIUS is authorized to review any 
foreign takeover transaction that implicates national security.95 
When a takeover or merger between a foreign and a U.S. company 
is contemplated, either a party to the transaction or any CFIUS 
representative may voluntarily notify CFIUS, such notification 
triggering review of the transaction.96 Voluntary review may 
actually benefit the foreign company. If CFIUS objects to the 
transaction, the company has the opportunity to restructure it and 
submit it for further review. 97 If the transaction successfully passes 
the review, CFIUS will not revisit the transaction later; the review 
functions effectively as a statute of limitations.98 Thus, a 
transaction that does not undergo voluntary review at the outset 
runs the risk of review at any time in the future, with the 
potentially devastating possibility of divestment months or years 
later. 
In summary, under subsection (a) of Exon-Florio, "[t]he President 
note (2000) (amending Executive Order 11,858 through which CFIUS was created). 
91 See Mendenhall, supra note 11, at 289. 
92 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
93 Sabino, supra note 4, at 20-21. 
94 [d. at 21. 
95 [d. 
96 See 31 C.F.R. § 800A01(a)-(b) (2006) ("A party or parties to an acquisition ... may 
submit a voluntary notice" and that "[a]ny member of the Committee may submit an agency 
notice of a proposed or completed acquisition to the Committee."). 
97 See Sabino, supra note 4, at 24. 
98 See 31 C.F.R. § 800.601(d)(2). 
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or the President's designee may make an investigation to determine 
the effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and 
takeovers ... by or with foreign persons which could result in 
foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the 
United States."99 
If an investigation is to be undertaken, it must commence no later 
than thirty days after the President or his designee receives written 
notification of the proposed transaction, and it must be completed 
no later than forty-five days after the determination to 
investigate. loo 
Under subsection (b), the President or his designee 
shall make an investigation, as described in subsection (a), in 
any instance in which an entity controlled by or acting on 
behalf of a foreign government seeks to engage in any 
merger, acquisition, or takeover which could result in control 
of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United 
States that could affect the national security of the United 
States. IOI 
The timetable is the same as in subsection (a).I02 
Subsection (c) sets up confidentiality standards.l°3 
In subsection (d), "the President may take such action ... to 
suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person 
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States ... by or with 
foreign persons so that such control will not threaten to impair the 
national security."104 Furthermore, "[t]he President shall announce 
the decision to take action ... not later than 15 days after the 
investigation ... is completed."lo5 
Subsection (e) provides the standard under which the President 
exercises authority.lo6 The President may exercise authority only 
on credible evidence that a foreign interest might take action that 
threatens to "impair the national security" and if other provisions of 
law do not "provide adequate and appropriate authority for the 
President to protect the national security."107 
99 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000). 
100 [d. 
101 [d. § 2170(b). 
102 See id. § 2170(b)(1)-(2). 
103 See id. § 2170(c). 
104 [d. § 2170(d). 
105 [d. 
106 See id. § 2170(e). 
107 [d. § 2170(e)(1)-(2). 
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Subsection (f) sets out factors to be considered in the 
investigation. lOB 
Subsection (g) provides for communication with Congress. l09 
Subsection (g) requires the President to provide written reports 
immediately to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the 
House explaining whether or not he has determined to take action, 
including explanations of the findings made and factors 
considered. 110 
Subsection (k) requires the President to report to Congress every 
four years on: (A) "evidence of a coordinated strategy ... to acquire 
United States companies involved in research, development, or 
production of critical technologies" and (B) evaluations of industrial 
espionage activities involving foreign governments against U.S. 
companies "aimed at obtaining commercial secrets related to critical 
technologies. "Ill 
Effectively, it is CFIUS that receives notice, rather than the 
President. As the President's designee, CFIUS has thirty days to 
review the acquisition after it has accepted the voluntary notice. 112 
This mirrors the thirty days given to the President or his designee 
under subsection (a) of Exon-Florio. 1l3 CFIUS must complete, its 
investigation no later than forty-five days after the date of 
commencement of the investigation.l14 This also mirrors the forty-
five days given to the President or his designee under subsection (b) 
of Exon-Florio. 1l5 Upon completion or termination of the 
investigation, CFIUS reports to the President and presents its 
recommendation. 116 The President then has fifteen days to 
announce his decision to take action. ll7 This mirrors the fifteen 
days set out in subsection (d) of Exon-Florio.l18 
Therefore, under Exon-Florio, to see if a proposed merger or 
takeover action will threaten national security, the President or his 
designee reviews, on a case-by-case basis, proposed foreign 
investment schemes under which the foreign player would acquire, 
108 See id, § 2170(f); see also infra Part V. 
109 See 50 U.S.C, app, § 2170(g), 
110 See id. 
111 Id. § 2170(k)(1)(A)-(B), 
112 31 C,F,R. § 800A04(a) (2006), 
113 See 50 U.S,C, app. § 2170(a). 
114 31 C,F.R. § 800,504(a), 
115 See 50 U.S.C, app, § 2170(b)(2), 
116 31 C.F,R. § 800.504(b), 
117 Id. § 800.601(a), 
118 See 50 U.S,C, app. § 2170(d), 
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merge with, or take over a U.S. company. The President's standard 
for investigation is discretionary for foreign corporate players and 
mandatory for foreign government players.119 Once a deal has been 
reviewed, however, the standard for suspending or prohibiting the 
takeover, merger, or acquisition no longer depends on whether the 
foreign players are corporate or governmental. The standard is 
only if the President finds that-(l) there is credible evidence 
that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest 
exercising control might take action that threatens to impair 
the national security, and (2) provi~ions of law ... do not ... 
provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President 
to protect the national security in the matter before the 
President. 12o 
IV. TRANSACTIONS LEADING TO REVISION OF EXON-FLORIO 
In the first several years after passage of Exon-Florio, CFIUS 
reviewed very few transactions. From 1988 through 1994, there 
were 918 voluntary CFIUS notifications.121 CFIUS conducted forty-
five-day investigations of fifteen transactions. 122 The President took 
action in one case, and, in five other cases, the companies withdrew 
their investment offers. 123 
Arguably, the process worked, but two particular situations 
among the fifteen that CFIUS had reviewed led Congress to believe 
that Exon-Florio should be broadened. Just as Exon-Florio itself 
grew out of two specific transactions, Goodyear and Fairchild,124 an 
amendment to Exon-Florio grew out of two later transactions. In 
the first case, the China National Aero-Technology Import and 
Export Corporation (CATIC), a Chinese government agency, 
proposed purchasing MAMCO Manufacturing Inc_, an aircraft parts 
maker located in Seattle, Washington.125 MAMCO notified CFIUS 
of the proposed purchase. 126 The transaction was concluded in 
119 See infra Part V (discussing the adoption of the mandatory standard with the passage 
of Byrd in 1993). 
120 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(1)-(2). 
121 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS: FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO AND RELATED AMENDMENTS 3 (1995) 
[hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIOj. 
122 Id. at 3-4. 
123 Id. at 4. 
124 See supra notes 50-74 and accompanying text. 
125 E.g., Alvarez, supra note 44, at 96. 
126 Id. at 96-97. 
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November 1988 while CFIUS review was still going on,127 
MAMCO's President believed that the transaction did not affect 
national security, noting that MAMCO sold metallic components 
that could be used in any type of aircraft, and thus they were not 
intended for military use,128 Buyers of MAMCO's products were 
U.S. manufacturers of commercial aircraft.129 The manufacturers 
provided the specifications for the parts they wanted, and MAMCO 
produced them,130 MAMCO neither designed its products nor had 
any full-time engineers,131 It also did not have classified contracts 
with the federal government. 132 MAMCO, in other words, had an 
innocuous reputatioQ.. CATIC, on the other hand, "had a reputation 
for disregarding foreign-export-control laws in order to obtain 
sensitive Western technology."133 CATIC was a purchasing agent 
for the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry,134 The Chinese 
Ministry "purchased, manufactured, and developed both civilian 
and military aircraft."135 To thwart CATIC, the United States had 
already imposed controls on aerospace exports to China. 136 In 
response, CATIC bought and disassembled two General Electric 
airplane engines,137 When MAMCO notified CFIUS of the 
transaction, CFIUS investigated both MAMCO's industrial 
capabilities138 and "the national security implications of CATIC's 
purchase of MAMCO."139 This review apparently led CFIUS to 
recommend that the President require divestiture. Based on a 
CFIUS report, President Bush announced that a portion of 
MAMCO's equipment was subject to U.S. export controls,140 As a 
result, on May 1, 1990, the President ordered CATIC to divest itself 
of its holdings in MAMCO within three months,141 Although CATIC 
never admitted that it would divest itself, it announced on August 2, 
1990 that it would sell MAMCO to DeCrane Aircraft Holdings Inc., 
127 Id. at 97. 
128 See id. at 97-98. 
129 Id. at 97. 
130 See Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Urged to Void Sale of Airplane-Parts Maker to Chinese, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at A9. 







138 See Alvarez, supra note 44, at 97. 
139 Mendenhall, supra note 11, at 291. 
140 See Alvarez, supra note 44, at 97. 
141 See Mendenhall, supra note 11, at 291. 
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a U.S. company.142 
According to one commentator, MAMCO illustrated what many 
observers believed was wrong with Exon-Florio.l43 Critics of Exon-
Florio144 believed that a basic problem was the undefined nature of 
"national security." In announcing the divestiture order, the White 
House's official statement concluded that CATIC's control of 
MAMCO was a possible threat to U.S. national security.145 The 
nature of this threat to national security, however, was never clear 
during the three months granted for the divestiture.146 
Furthermore, nothing in the statute itself or in its legislative 
history gave rise to an exact definition of "divestiture."147 CATIC 
did not at first agree to fully divest itself of MAMCO.148 Instead, 
CATIC stated that it would look for a mutually acceptable 
solution.l49 Some theorized that CATIC might have been able to 
divest itself of control while retaining actual ownership of 
MAMCO.l50 
The second case that led Congress to believe that Exon-Florio 
should be revisited was the attempted acquisition in 1992 of LTV 
Corporation's Missile Division by Thomson, a company owned by 
the French governmerit. 151 Thomson produced consumer electronics 
and semiconductors.l52 Thomson-CSF tried to take over LTV 
Corporation's Missile Division as a way to produce "a complete 
missile system"153 and as a "source of high technology wealth."154 
Though bankrupt, LTV would be an invaluable acquisition because 
of its "cutting edge systems incorporating secret, government-
funded technology." 155 CFIUS investigated the transaction, as 
Congress and the media scrutinized it.156 Recognizing that 
142 Id. at 292. 
143 See id. at 289. 
144 See, e.g., id. 
145 See id. at 291. 
146 See id. One factor may have been that CATIC reportedly had ties to the People's 
Liberation Army. See W. Robert Shearer, Comment, The Exon·Florio Amendment: 
Protectionist Legislation Susceptible to Abuse, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1729, 1757 (1993). 
147 Mendenhall, supra note 11, at 291. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. 
150 E.g., id. 
151 IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-FLORIO, supra note 121, at 4. 
152 See Jeremy David Sacks, Note, Monopsony and the Archers: Rethinking Foreign 
Acquisitions After Thomson-LTV, 25 LAw & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1019, 1024 (1994). 
153 Fenton, supra note 59, at 207. 
154 Sacks, supra note 152, at 1024. 
155 Id. 
156 See, e.g., Bruce van Voorst, Giving Away the Weapons Store; The Proposed Sale of a 
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President Bush was likely to officially reject it, Thomson-CSF 
withdrew its offer and significantly restructured its proposal. 
Thomson-CSF finally partnered with Loral Corporation, a U.S. 
based company, in a joint acquisition of L TV. 157 
These two proposed transactions, MAMCO and Thomson-LTV, 
fueled Congress's belief that Exon-Florio must be revised to be able 
to aggressively protect national security. The common point in the 
rejection of these two transactions was not necessarily the severity 
of the threat to national security, but rather that both foreign 
investors were governmental actors. The decision to require 
divestiture in the MAMCO transaction was contrary to the Bush 
Administration's history in these cases. The Bush Administration 
had previously refused to order divestiture in seemingly more 
serious cases in which takeovers involved U.S. companies that were 
subject to "munitions controls," that produced "microchip and 
electronics technology," or that produced "hardware and software 
for aerospace and spacecraft."158 According to one commentator, 
"Bush appeared loathe to use Exon-Florio as a tool of economic 
protectionism."159 The only way to understand the divestiture order 
is that "[t]he administration may have viewed the transaction less 
as one between two private parties than as a deal between a 
domestic manufacturer and the Chinese government."160 
Thomson was also fundamentally different from the foreign 
companies that routinely slid through CFIUS review to consummate 
acquisitions of U.S. companies. First, Thomson, unlike CATIC, was 
directly trying to take over a U.S. defense industry company. 
Second, like CATIC, Thomson was "essentially a nationalized 
industry, approximately sixty percent of which [was] owned by the 
French government."161 
v. THE BYRD AMENDMENT OF 1993-REVISION OF EXON-FLORIO 
To address Exon-Florio's perceived weakness against possible 
takeovers by foreign governments or their sponsored actors, 
Congress passed the Byrd Amendment to Exon-Florio as part of the 
Troubled Defense Contractor to the French Triggers an Argument Over America's Security 
Needs, TIME, June 1, 1992, at 37. 
157 Fenton, supra note 59, at 207. 
158 Mendenhall, supra note 11, at 293. 
159 ld. 
160 ld. 
161 Sacks, supra note 152, at 1025. 
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.162 Byrd 
changed Exon-Florio in three ways.163 
First, Byrd made changes regarding what is reviewed and when it 
is reviewed. Byrd mandated review in instances where the 
company seeking to merge, acquire, or take over a U.S. company 
was "controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government."164 
This mandatory review is triggered if the transaction "could result 
in control of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United 
States that could affect the national security of the United 
States."165 This change is significant because it is a broader 
standard than the "threatens to impair the national security" 
standard that is employed when the transaction involves a foreign 
entity that is not a foreign government. 166 
Second, Byrd added two factors to those originally included for 
the President or his designee to consider in reviewing proposed 
takeover transactions. The original three factors were 
(1) domestic production needed for projected national 
defense requirements, 
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to 
meet national defense requirements, including the 
availability of human resources, products, technology, 
materials, and other supplies and services, [and] 
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial 
activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and 
capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of 
national security.167 
Byrd added two more factors. The first related to the "potential 
effectD" of the transaction on various military sales to foreign 
countries that meet specified criteria.168 The second related to the 
"potential effectD" of the transaction on the technological leadership 
role of the United States in areas "affecting United States national 
security." 169 
The "potential effects" language under subsection (f)( 4) makes it 
162 Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2315, 2463-65 (1992) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000». 
163 See id. 
164 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b). 
165 Id. 
166 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 (2006). 
167 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(0(1)-(3). 
168 Id. § 2170(0(4). 
169 Id. § 2170(0(5). 
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easier for CFIUS to reject transactions that might eventually result 
in sales of military items to countries with terrorism ties or possible 
"weapons of mass destruction" capabilities. The "potential effects" 
language under subsection. (f)(5) enables CFIUS to consider 
transactions that the acquirer could enter into with other companies 
later, after successfully merging with or taking over a U.S. 
company. 
Third, Byrd added the following notification requirements. Under 
subsection (g), "[t]he President shall immediately transmit to the 
Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives a written report of the President's determination of 
whether or not to take action ... , including a detailed explanation 
of the findings made ... and the factors considered."170 Under 
subsection (k), the President shall report every four years as to 
"whether there is credible evidence of a coordinated strategy by 1 or 
more countries or companies to acquire United States companies 
involved in research, development, or production of critical 
technologies for which the United States is a leading producer"l7l 
and "whether there are industrial espionage activities directed or 
directly assisted by foreign governments against private United 
States companies aimed at obtaining commercial secrets related to 
critical technologies."l72 This addition to Exon-Florio has been 
posited as the most important because "[i]t sends a clear message to 
CFIUS that Congress will carefully review its consideration of 
proposed investments involving foreign government-owned 
entities."l73 
The other changes were arguably unnecessary. For example, 
upon notification, CFIUS could already conduct an investigation of 
any transaction that implicated national security, and certainly 
transactions with foreign governments would raise red flags.l 74 
Furthermore, although Byrd created a mandatory review of 
transactions involving foreign governments, it did not create a 
mandatory reporting mechanism for the parties. 175 Since the 
parties need not notify CFIUS, the mandatory review may never be 
triggered. 176 
170 Id. § 2170(g). 
171 Id. § 2170(k)(1)(A). 
172 Id. § 2170(k)(1)(B). 
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It may be difficult to prove that every step of the review process 
works ideally, since the process is designed to work "in the 
shadows."l77 However, there are no reported instances of foreign 
acquisitions leading to security breaches. Critics argue that there 
has only been one divestment among the 1,600 cases reviewed since 
Exon-Florio was enacted in 1988,l78 "However, these figures do not 
reflect the full impact of the CFIUS process on addressing national 
security concerns raised by proposed foreign acquisitions of U.S. 
companies."179 First of all, "the vast majority of foreign acquisitions 
have no bearing on U.S. national security. Rather, they play a 
positive role and make significant - and increasing - contributions 
to our economy by creating millions of jobs . . . and enhancing our 
competitive position in the global marketplace."18o Second, if CFIUS 
does decide that a particular transaction warrants the opening of an 
investigation, in general, "companies respond by abandoning the 
planned acquisition or, in a smaller number of cases, by offering to 
restructure the acquisition in a way that addresses the security 
concerns raised by CFIUS."181 A further criticism of the CFIUS 
process is that it may pay too little attention to the transactions it 
reviews because it is "staffed by midlevel officials."182 However, if 
the reviewing members dispute a decision to approve a transaction, 
the decision "would be escalated to the cabinet level or to the 
President for appeal."183 
177 Sabino, supra note 4, at 25. 
178 The only case in which the President has ordered divestiture was the MAMCO 
transaction. See supra Part IV. 
)79 CFIUS and the Role of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology of the 
H. Financial Servo Comm. 3 (2006) (statement of the Honorable Donald L. Evans, Chief 
Executive Officer, The Financial Services Forum), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/medialpdf/042706de.pdf [hereinafter Statement of the 
Honorable Donald L. Evans]. 
180 Id. at 1-2. 
181 Lewis, supra note 43, at 465. 
182 [d. at 464. 
183 Id. at 465. 
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VI. CALLS FOR CHANGE TO CFIUS REVIEW-CNOOC AND DUBAI 
PORTS WORLD 
A. CNOOC 
Two recent transactions have triggered calls in Congress for 
further changes to the CFIUS review process. Some have advocated 
expanding both the CFIUS review criteria and Congress's role in 
the process. IS4 These proposals were triggered by a potential 
takeover involving a Chinese company with ties to the Chinese 
government. IS5 A second round of discussion was touched-off by the 
potential agreement between DP World, a company owned by the 
United Arab Emirates, and a U.K. company to sell control of port 
operations in six American ports to the U.A.E. company.lS6 Various 
congressional bills, introduced specifically in response to the DP 
World situation, would have forced either a forty-five-day 
investigation or a complete blockage of the transaction. IS7 Another 
bill would have required giving Congress the same power to veto 
foreign acquisitions that the President had. ISS Still another would 
have "require[d] majority American ownership of US critical 
infrastructure (including divestiture of critical infrastructure 
currently not majority American owned)."IS9 
On June 23, 2005, CNOOC, a subsidiary of the state-owned China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation, made an all cash bid totaling 
$18.5 billion for Unocal Oip90 Unocal had already agreed to be 
acquired by Chevron for $16.5 billion.l91 China experts recognized 
that the deal would trigger concern in Congress ''because CNOOC 
[was] a government-owned company."192 But, for a variety of 
184 E.g., Edward M. Graham & David M. Marchick, Op·Ed., A Misplaced Curb on 
Investment, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 5, 2005, at 15. 
185 See Jonathan Weisman & Peter S. Goodman, China's Oil Bid Riles Congress, WASH. 
POST, June 24, 2005, at AOI (addressing an "$18.5 billion bid ... by China's third· largest oil 
producer to buy California· based Unocal Corp"). 
186 E.g., Patrick McGeehan, Despite Fears, a Dubai Company Will Help Run Ports in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,2006, at Bl. 
187 Randall Jackson & Maeve Dion, CFIUS Update -. Dubai Ports World, GEO. MAsON U.: 




190 Weisman & Goodman, supra note 185, at AOl. 
191 Id. 
192 Is CNOOC'S Bid for Unocal a Threat to America?, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON, Nov. 21, 
2005, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.eduJarticle.cfm?articleid=1240. 
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reasons, observers thought that the deal would be able to pass 
CFIUS review. 193 For example, in China's favor, CNOOC held 
''billions of dollars in U.S. Treasury securities," which helped 
finance the operations of the U.S. government.194 On the other 
hand, the deal presented two problems for U.S. regulators. First 
was the controversial nature of the commodity--oil. Unocal was 
attractive to CNOOC because seventy percent of Unocal's oil and 
natural gas reserves were in Asia or near the Caspian Sea-areas 
that China could more easily develop than Unocal.195 Unfortunately 
for CNOOC, according to a Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
researcher, "[a]s a strategic energy resource, petroleum has seen its 
price rocket on the international market since last summer. To take 
over a foreign oil company at such a time would not only increase 
takeover costs, but also heighten worries in the country of the 
bought company."196 This was indeed the case. In July 2005, the 
House of Representatives, by a vote of 398 to 15, called on President 
Bush to review the bid. 197 The measure cited national security 
threats.198 U.S. officials acknowledged "fierce disquiet over a 
Chinese company controlling a major player in the sensitive US 
energy sector."199 
Because CNOOC was a government-owned entity, it expected 
CFIUS review. CNOOC's Chief Executive came to the United 
States to help negotiate the deal. He said in an interview that the 
company would cooperate with CFIUS in any review it undertook.2oo 
The Chinese Foreign Ministry characterized the deal as a "normal 
commercial activity between enterprises" and expressed the hope 
that politics would not interfere.201 "Unocal ... insisted [that] 
CNOOC raise its offer to compensate for the ... delays" that might 
have resulted from the review process.202 CNOOC, apparently 
thinking that the transaction was doomed, withdrew its offer. 
193 E.g., id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 CNOOC Withdraws Unocal Bid, CHINA INTERNET INFO. CENTER, Aug. 3, 2005, 
http://www.china.org.cnlenglishl2005/Aug/137165.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 FM' CNOOC's Unocal Bid Is Pure Business, CHiNADAlLY.COM.CN, June 29, 2005, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cnlenglishldod2005-06/29/content_455555.htm. 
200 Id. 
201 Peter S. Goodman, China Tells Congress to Back Off Businesses; Tensions Heightened 
by Bid to Purchase Unocal, WASH. POST, July 5, 2005, at A01 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
202 CNOOC Withdraws Unocal Bid, supra note 196. 
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B. Dubq,i Ports World 
DP World, "a state-owned company located in the United Arab 
Emirates," and London-based P&O, which ran port operations at six 
American ports, entered into an agreement whereby DP World 
would acquire P&O.203 In October 2005~ the two companies 
informally asked for voluntary CFIUS review under Exon-Florio.204 
According to a Treasury Department press release, various analyses 
and threat assessments were undertaken even before the companies 
formally requested review on December 16, 2005.205 Thus, the 
thirty-day formal review required under section 2170(a) began on 
December 17. During this thirty-day period, the Department of 
Homeland Security took the lead as the specific CFIUS member 
with expertise on port security.206 On January 17, 2006, CFIUS 
unanimously agreed to allow this transaction to proceed.207 CFIUS 
also unanimously agreed that it need not undertake the additional 
forty-five-day investigation mandated by section 2170(b) for entities 
controlled by or acting on behalf of foreign governments.208 
Members of Congress voiced strong concerns about why the 
mandatory forty-five-day review had been dispensed with and how 
the deal would affect security at the six ports.209 In response, DP 
World resubmitted the transaction to CFIUS for the forty-five-day 
reVIew. 
Critics continued to worry that allowing DP World to take over 
port operations posed a national security risk based on "the UAE's 
history as an operational and financial base for the hijackers who 
carried out the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks."210 In addition, "a bipartisan 
group of seven House and Senate members" argued that "although 
the UAE may have a strongly pro-U.S. government, the country was 
traversed by some of the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers and its banking 
system has been used by groups affiliated with al Qaeda."211 
203 Press Release, Dep't of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security 
in Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006), 






208 Jackson & Dion, supra note 187. 
209 [d. 
210 Lawmakers Seek Review of Dubai Ports World Deal, NEWSMAx.cOM, Feb. 16, 2006, 
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/artic1es/2006/2/16/140709.shtml?s=lh. 
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Supporters, including President Bush, pointed out that the 
transaction involved only operations at the six ports and that DP 
World would not own any ports or manage port security.212 
Even though the forty-five-day review was still in progress, DP 
World, responding to the strong negative reaction to the transaction 
in Congress and in the media, announced that it would sell the U.S. 
port operations to a U.S. company.213 
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CNOOC AND DUBAI PORTS WORLD 
TRANSACTIONS 
A. Balancing Two Imperatives: Economic Welfare and National 
Security 
1. CNOOC 
The CNOOC and DP World transactions illustrate the two 
imperatives, economic welfare214 and national security, that have 
dominated review of foreign investment in the United States. Both 
transactions triggered CFIUS reviews on the basis of national 
security because the acquiring companies were government owned. 
The CNOOC deal also implicated national security because the 
result of the transaction would have been the foreign acquisition of 
a sensitive sector of the U.S. economy--oil. CNOOC's acquisition of 
Unocal would have meant that CNOOC controlled some amount of a 
commodity that was vital to U.S. interests. Rejecting this 
transaction seemed to protect national security interests by 
protecting the economic welfare of the oil sector. 
Congress had struggled with the balance between these two 
imperatives, finally writing economic welfare out of Exon-Florio in 
1988.215 It creeps back into the calculati9n from time to time, as in 
the CNOOC transaction, where control of oil as a commodity was 
seen to have economic and security ramifications. According to 
Christopher Mark, Chairman of the Signal Group, Unocal's 
2006, at All. 
212 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: The CFIUS Process and the DP World 
Transaction (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/print/ 
20060222-11.html. 
213 E.g., Jackson & Dion, supra note 187. 
214 Economic welfare refers to policies intended to protect domestic industry. 
215 See supra note 6. 
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shareholders should have decided CNOOC's offer to buy Unocal.216 
According to Mark, the deal "d[id] have political sensitivities 
written all over it. And we have seen . . . some of the expected 
criticism of the deal in terms of scarce American resources being 
snapped up by a Communist-run government. That, on the face of 
it, create[d] political concern."217 That concern was outweighed for 
Mark by the broader concern of "attracting foreign investors to th[e] 
country" so as to support the investment needs of the United 
States.218 
Yihong Xia, a Wharton finance professor, also saw the CNOOC 
deal as a legitimate business transaction with no 
serious threat to the national interest of the U.S. It is not 
like a Chinese company taking over the production of F-16 
fighters. A free and open capital market is a two-way, not a 
one-way, street. There will be capital inflows and outflows, 
and there will be foreign direct investment to developing 
countries such as China and vice versa.219 
Although national security was the ostensible reason for opposing 
the Chinese takeover of Unocal, the CNOOC transaction ultimately 
failed because of the protectionism inherent in economic welfare. 
The CNOOC transaction prompted two reactions in Congress. 
The first reaction was to advocate a rejection of the current 
standard of "national security," calling instead for a reinstatement 
of the old concept, introduced in 1962 and eliminated in 1988, that 
CFIUS review should focus on "national and economic security."22o 
However, the problem with broadening the scope of review in this 
way was that it would have taken Exon-Florio back to Senator 
Exon's original proposal by adding in the very language that would 
have caused President Reagan to veto the 1988 Trade Act.221 It 
allowed too much scope for the protection of domestic industries 
that had nothing to do with national security. In the past, 
producers of "clothespin[s], peanut[s], pottery, shoe[s], pen[s], paper, 
and pencil[s]" have invoked national security to protect their 
industries.222 Most importantly, adding economic security back to 
Exon -Florio confuses the distinction between economic welfare and 
216 See Is CNOOC'S Bid for Unocal a Threat to America?, supra note 192. 
217 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
218 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
219 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
220 Graham & Marchick, supra note 184, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
221 See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text. 
222 Liebeler & Lash III, supra note 58. 
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economic policy_ CFIUS review should be able to consider economic 
foreign policy, but economic welfare should not be a serious factor in 
the review. Based on the insight "that it is not economically viable 
to ensure that all strategic technologies are 'made in the USA,' and 
indeed that there are security benefits from global competition,"223 it 
is proper to make economic foreign policy a part of the national 
security review. Bringing back the protectionist standard of 
economic security makes it too easy to deter legitimate business 
deals that do not truly implicate national security. 
The second reaction to the CNOOC transaction was to call for 
expanding the role of Congress to enable it to require CFIUS to 
conduct extended reviews of certain transactions.224 This proposal 
would have created a congressional veto by enabling Congress to 
stop transactions that the President had already approved.225 It 
would have effectively removed review from the Executive, and it 
would have made the review process needlessly more politica1.226 
2. Dubai Ports World 
In contrast to the CNOOC situation, DP World illustrates the 
national security imperative in a situation where economic welfare 
was not a factor. DP World, in contrast to CNOOC, dealt in 
services, not commodities. Thus the transaction would not have 
resulted in the control of a vital commodity. It would, however, 
have seemed to result in control of another sensitive sector of the 
economy-our ports. The national security implications of the DP 
World transaction were fundamentally different from the earlier 
situations in which foreign companies established a physical 
presence in the United States. When the Japanese bought 
Rockefeller Plaza in 1989, there was an outcry based on the 
perceived inappropriateness of a foreign owner taking over a 
beloved American landmark. 227 But aside from hurt pride at loss of 
ownership, Americans had no real reason to dispute the soundness 
223 Peter Lichtenbaum, National Security, and U.S. Trade and Investment Policy, in 
COMMERCIAL LAw AND PRACTICE, COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 313, 319 (2005). 
224 E.g., Graham & Marchick, supra note 184, at 15. 
225 Id. 
226 See Statement of the Honorable Donald L. Evans, supra note 179, at 2. In his overview 
remarks, Mr. Evans said that "it is instructive that upon establishing CFIUS Congress wisely 
chose to insulate it from political influence .... The rationale supporting [this] decisionO is as 
valid today as it was two decades ago." Id. 
227 See, e.g., Dorothy J. Glancy, Preserving Rockefeller Center, 24 URB. LAw. 423, 423 (1992) 
("The Japanese investment was extensively, even sensationally, reported in the press."). 
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of that business decision. 
However, in the post-September 11 world, America has adopted a 
siege mentality. The country is more insular and more suspicious of 
the outside world than it was prior to the September 11 attacks. 228 
The thought of a Middle Eastern government running U.S. port 
operations struck many as putting the fox in charge of the 
henhouse.229 The physical presence of DP World in the United 
States was an important difference between this transaction and 
the CNOOC situation. Controlling operations at six U.S. ports 
would have woven the foreign company into the fabric of the 
homeland in a way that giving access to oil from offshore sources 
would not. Even though DP World offered assurances that its key 
employees in the United States would be American citizens,23o and 
although it welcomed the further forty-five-day CFIUS review, the 
transaction could not overcome the public's perception that the 
President had been blind to the security risks when he allowed the 
deal to be consummated. The DP World transaction forced us to 
confront a third, and new, imperative for reviewing foreign 
investment-protection of the homeland against the threat of 
terrorism. 
B. Adding a Third Imperative: Super-National Security 
The DP World transaction brought a third imperative in foreign 
investment review to the fore-protecting the homeland, a sort of 
super-national security. Uncontrolled, it could dominate traditional 
national security concerns. Homeland security is the very stuff of 
politics, and it is, for this reason, far better examined under the 
rational light of CFIUS than under the white heat of the political 
arena. 
This imperative to protect the homeland can be expressed 
neutrally. Political observers do this. For example, one pair of 
commentators described a significant focus for the current 
Administration as "protection of critical infrastructure."231 This is a 
change from the focus of prior Administrations on the export of 
228 See, e.g., Op-Ed., Good·bye to Dubai, BLADE, Mar. 16, 2006, at 12 ("Though the actual 
security risk may have been more perception than reality, the deal still disturbed millions of 
Americans not yet ready to relegate 9/11 to the history books."). 
229 See, e.g., Arab Firm OKs Review of Takeover, BLADE, Feb. 27, 2006, at 1 ("[M]embers of 
both political parties erupted in furor, questioning the administration's judgment and 
promising to delay the deal, if not scuttle it."). 
230 See, e.g., Editorial, An Ally Bows Out, BALT. SUN, Mar. 10,2006, at 16A. 
231 Graham & Marchick, supra note 184, at 15. 
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sensitive technologies. Blocking the sale of Unocal's or DP World's 
purchase of P&O can be explained in neutral terms as protection of 
critical infrastructure. 232 
Much more often, the principle of protecting the homeland will be 
expressed emotionally. Political actors are driven to this form of 
expression. A bill by Republican Representative Duncan Hunter of 
California, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, 
would protect critical infrastructure by barring foreign ownership.233 
According to Mr. Hunter, "[t]o those who say this is protectionism, I 
say, America is worth protecting."234 This type of rhetoric is not 
confined to one side of the aisle. Democratic Senators Robert 
Menendez, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Frank Lautenberg, and 
Barbara Boxer also authored legislation to prevent sales of U.S. port 
operations to companies with foreign ownership.235 In their letter to 
Senate Majority Leader William Frist, in which they asked him to 
bring this legislation up for debate, the Senators' tone is less 
blatantly cheerleading than Hunter's but equally calculated to 
appeal to the emotions.236 Without establishing a factual basis, they 
conclude that "[t]his sale will create an unacceptable risk to the 
security of our ports."237 They justify their emergency legislation 
with an emotionally amorphous antiterrorism appeal, stating that 
"[t] his issue transcends philosophical posturing and partisan 
bickering - it is about our nation's security."238 
This type of rhetoric was not confined to members of Congress. It 
was employed at leadership levels as well. House Republican 
Conference Chairwoman Deborah Pryce issued a statement whose 
combination of apparently neutral commentary and emotionally-
laden sentiments manages simultaneously to trash the CFIUS 
process, to proclaim the patriotism of Congress, and to patronize the 
United Arab Emirates. Pryce stated: 
232 See Clark & Jayaram, supra note 86, at 395. Other examples of the Bush 
Administration's broader view of the types of transactions it considers threats to national 
security are "acquisitions of telecommunications and Internet service companies. These have 
included Nippon Telegraph and Telephone's purchase of Verio, Vodafone's purchase of 
AirTouch, and Deutsche Telekom's purchase of VoiceStream." [d. (footnotes omitted). 
233 Port Deal Has Many Asking Who Owns U.S., BLADE, Mar. 20, 2006, at 1. 
234 [d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
235 See Press Release, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Menendez, Clinton, Lautenberg, 
Boxer Urge Frist to Immediately Consider Legislation to Block Foreign Governments from 
Controlling Operations at U.S. Ports (Feb. 21, 2006), http://clinton.senate.gov/news/ 
statements/details.cfm?id=251764. 
236 [d. 
237 [d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
238 [d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Since 9/11, Congress has rightfully invested millions of 
dollars to strengthen our nation's seaports, and has called for 
comprehensive security improvements costing billions more 
over the next decade. Selling the management rights of 
these ports to foreign interests without thorough review, 
however, undermines public confidence in our efforts to date, 
and appears antithetical to our goal of improving port 
security. 
While I am certain that CFIUS used dispassionate, 
objective criteria in its decision-making process, the profound 
importance of this decision made by an agency relatively 
unknown to the American public requires that transparency 
be applied to the process. While CFIUS is required to reach 
its conclusion devoid of political considerations or public 
perception, Congress is not similarly hamstrung, and can 
thus evaluate the transaction to ensure it does not diminish 
public confidence in our security. 
As the Chair of the Subcommittee on Domestic and 
International Monetary Policy (DIMP) which oversees 
CFIUS, I have directed the subcommittee to thoroughly 
evaluate the process CFIUS used in approving the sale of the 
management rights of these ports. Should it be determined 
that greater oversight or subsequent action is needed 
pursuant to this review, my subcommittee will be prepared 
to take the next appropriate steps. 
The United Arab Emirates is a partner and ally in the 
War on Terror. And for that reason, the UAE should 
welcome a thorough review of this transaction - if Dubai 
Ports World can effectively manage these ports without 
putting any aspect of America's security at risk, then a 
Congressional analysis of the matter should bear this out.239 
In the first paragraph, Pryce suggests that the management of 
port rights was sold without thorough review.240 In the second 
paragraph, Pryce first praises CFIUS (it used "dispassionate, 
objective criteria") and then damns it ("relatively unknown to the 
239 Press Release, Congresswoman Deborah Pryce: House Republican Conference 
Chairwoman, Pryce Statement on Dubai Ports World Transaction (Feb. 21, 2006), 
http://www.house.gov/pryce/06%20releases/022206_dubai_transaction.htm (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
240 See id. 
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American public").241 She repeats this structure in the next 
sentence, first praising the CFIUS process (CFIUS's conclusions 
must be reached "devoid of political considerations or public 
perception") and then damns it ("Congress is not similarly 
hamstrung").242 However, these requirements do not hamstring 
CFIUS. The reason that review is delegated to CFIUS is to keep 
the review process dispassionate and objective. These are the 
requirements under which the CFIUS process operates. They free 
the Committee to reach nonpolitical decisions. By saying that 
Congress is not hamstrung, Pryce implies that a passionate and 
subjective congressional review is more likely to protect the nation 
than CFIUS review. In the final sentence, Pryce assumes that the 
integrity of the transaction, already analyzed and approved by 
CFIUS, is still in doubt. Nevertheless, she further suggests that if 
Congress is able to find a reason to support the transaction, the 
United Arab Emirates should mind neither the delay nor the 
aspersions cast on its reputation.243 
The problem lies in balancing the neutral and the emotional 
views. The Executive must have the flexibility to respond to true 
threats to national security while still encouraging foreign 
investment. CFIUS review is set up to achieve that flexibly neutral 
view. One aspect of this flexibility is providing the Executive 
Branch with the tools necessary to give close scrutiny to 
acquisitions of potential concern while avoiding undue exposure of 
sensitive commercial or classified information. The statute requires 
the President to report to Congress after completion of CFIUS 
reviews, as well as every four years.244 
Even though the members of Congress have the means to confirm 
that the Administration is making proper use of this delegated 
authority, they still may criticize the process as secret. CFIUS is 
routinely so characterized.245 One of the major criticisms made by 
Conference Chairwoman Pryce is that the process lacks 
transparency.246 However, the CFIUS review process is meant to be 
secret.247 Indeed, loosening the safeguards that protect companies' 
241 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
242 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
243 See id. 
244 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g), (k)(1) (2000). 
245 For example, a wire service reported that "government-owned Dubai Ports World had 
won approval for the $6.8 billion deal from a secretive U.S. panel." Lawmakers Seek Review 
of Dubai Ports World Deal, supra note 210. 
246 See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
247 Graham & Marchick, supra note 184, at 15. 
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sensitive financial and strategic information would chill foreign 
direct investment. Further, if Congress could use its proposed veto 
power248 to overturn the President's national security decisions on 
particular transactions, then the chill would be even deeper. 
Ifthere is no balance between the neutral and the emotional view, 
then the United States runs the risk of four specific backlashes. 
First, we could face a backlash in our own future foreign investment 
transactions. According to Professor Xia, commenting on the then-
proposed CNOOC deal, "CNOOC . . . seemed to be caught by 
surprise that a better and economically sensible offer [for Unocal] 
would be met by such an uproar in Washington."249 Professor Xia 
continues by stating that the uproar "may even give the Chinese 
government a good excuse to meddle with future U.S. business 
transactions in China."25o 
Second, we run the risk of a backlash if our actions result in a 
decline in direct foreign investment. Stigmatizing legitimate 
business transactions as security risks may weaken "confidence in 
the dollar as the major global currency."251 Foreign investors may 
think twice about investing in the United States if by doing so they 
run the risk of being branded as terrorist supporters. In 2004, 
foreign investors invested about $100 billion in U.S. businesses and 
real estate.252 According to a CRS Report for Congress, "[t]he 
cumulative amount ... of foreign direct investment in the United 
States on a historical cost basis increased ... in 2003 to nearly $1.4 
trillion."253 This foreign investment matters. Writing about 
CNOOC approximately a year before the DP World transaction, a 
Financial Times article says that "slow [ing] the flow of foreign 
direct investment into the US" could potentially "be a huge error 
given America's need to attract such investment to finance its 
current account deficit."254 The United States finances its deficit by 
248 See Statement of the Honorable Donald L. Evans, supra note 179, at 4 (expressing 
concern over the impact of "overt political considerations" on investor confidence in U.S. 
markets). 
249 Is CNOOC's Bid for Unocal a Threat to America?, supra note 192 (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
250 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
251 Robert J. Samuelson, Save Us from Our Politicians; The Controversy Over Dubai Ports 
World Was a Great Victory for Them .. But a Defeat for Candor and Sensible Security and 
Economic Policies, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2006, at 33. 
252 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS) REPORT FOR CONGRESS, 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1 (2005). 
253 Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). 
254 Graham & Marchick, supra note 184, at 15. 
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borrowing an equivalent amount.255 It then makes payments "to 
central bankers in China, Japan, Taiwan, and to other foreign 
entities and individuals."256 Debating the ills of a large deficit is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, commentators on the 
deficit point out that anything that tends to prompt foreign entities 
and individuals to give up their holdings in U.S. dollars can have a 
widespread effect not only on our economy, but also on the global 
economy.257 
The third backlash could be that we jeopardize the cooperation we 
want and need from foreign governments in the war on terror. The 
two imperatives of economic welfare and national security may be 
seen to correlate with a world view of "us versus them," arising from 
state-based considerations such as national competitiveness.258 
Goodyear Tire rhetoric symbolizes this.259 However, in today's 
increasingly globalized economy, "us versus them" is losing viability 
as an economic consideration. For example, "the Defense 
Department now emphasizes procuring from the best-quality, best 
value supplier, which in many cases may be a foreign supplier. 
Moreover. . the Defense Department now procures many 
commercial items, further increasing the ability of foreign suppliers 
to compete."260 DP World is an experienced port operator engaged 
in port operations around the world,261 and thus there is no 
economic rationale that works to keep it out of American port 
operations.262 
255 David R. Francis, Losing Patience with US Trade Deficit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 
29, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.coml2004/0729/p17s01-stgn.html. 
256 [d. 
257 E.g., Samuelson, supra note 251, at 33 ("[G]lobal economic stability depends on 
foreigners' keeping ... those [deficit] dollars. Mass dollar sales could trigger turmoil on the 
world's currency ... markets. People outside the United States ... believe the currency ... 
offers a wide menu of investment choices. The message from Congress [after DP World] is 
that the menu is shorter .... "). 
258 Fenton, supra note 59, at 202 (discussing, for example, the idea that the nation which 
controls semiconductors will also control future computer development). 
259 Goodyear touted itself as a "treasured midwestern 'institution.'" Alvarez, supra note 44, 
at 57. 
260 Lichtenbaum, supra note 223, at 318. 
261 DP World operates container terminals in Hong Kong, China, Australia, Germany, 
Romania, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Djibouti. It is also developing facilities in Turkey, Yarimca, and Qingdao. DP 
World, http://portal.pohub.com/portallpage?_pageid=761,248333&_dad=pogprtl&_ 
schema=POGPRTL (last visited Nov. 10,2006). 
262 Interestingly, despite the boycott by the United Arab Emirates of Israel, the Israeli 
shipper Zim wrote a letter to Senator Hillary Clinton on February 22, 2006 to voice its 
support for DP World in light of the "concerns and misinformation about DP World in the US 
media." Letter from Idan Ofer, Chairman of the Bd., Zim Integrated Shipping Servs. Ltd., to 
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The emotional reaction to transactions such as CNOOC's offer for 
Unocal harks back to a time when the homeland could more easily 
be protected because ''borders were clearly demarcated, industries 
were national, and key services were state-owned or provided by 
national firms."263 That reaction ignores the reality of a globalized 
economy based On the internationalization of ownership. Today, 
"inward and outbound flows of cross-border investment . . . have 
increased substantially in both quantity and value, with mergers 
and acquisitions serving as the primary vehicles of growth."264 The 
broad scale of foreign investment activity in the United States 
mandates that transactions be reviewed in a consistent manner that 
considers all aspects. Reacting to each individual transaction with 
the highly charged rhetoric seen in response to the CNOOC and DP 
World deals takes us back to the "us versus them" days of secure 
national borders-days that are gone forever. 
In terms of the third imperative, homeland security, however, we 
still maintain the "us versus them" mentality. "They," the 
terrorists, want to harm us, and they want to do it on our soil; thus 
we are driven to implement ever more stringent measures to stop 
"them" from infiltrating the homeland. Under this view, DP World 
can never be allowed to operate on our shores. We must be careful 
not to allow the national preoccupation with terrorism to blind us to 
the reality of a globalized economy. We must be careful that we do 
not make terrorism the only lens through which we view national 
security. 
Largely because of the uproar over the DP World deal, CFIUS 
conducted a forty-five-day review of another Dubai-owned 
company's transaction.265 Dubai International Capital LLC wanted 
Hillary Clinton, Senator, N.Y. (Feb. 22, 2006), available at 
http://i.a.cnn.neticnnJ2006/images/03/02Izim.letter.final.pdf. Wrote Zim's Chairman of the 
Board Idan Ofer: 
As an Israeli company, security is of the utmost importance to us and we require 
rigorous security measures from terminal operators in every country in which we 
operate, but especially in Arab countries, and we are very comfortable calling at DP 
World's Dubai ports. During our long association with DP World, we have not 
experienced a single security issue in these ports or in any of the terminals operated by 
DP World and have received exemplary service that enhances our efficiency and the 
smooth running of our operations. 
Id. 
263 Lewis, supra note 43, at 461. 
264 Fenton, supra note 59, at 196. 
265 See Jim Abrams, Dubai Gets Green Light for Operations at Connecticut Plants, 
BOSTON.COM, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/locallconnecticut/articies/2006/04/ 
28/dubai_gets~een_light_for_operations_at_connecticut_plants. CFIUS review began on 
January 28, 2006. Id. CFIUS made its recommendation to support the transaction to the 
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to acquire Doncasters Group Ltd., a U.K. engineering company that 
supplies parts to makers of aircraft and jet engines with plants in 
the United States. 266 The President approved the transaction on the 
recommendation of CFIUS,267 after receiving "assurances that the 
military supply chain would not be broken."268 Unlike the DP World 
situation, where congressional opposition ultimately derailed the 
transaction, congressional response was muted. According to House 
aides, "lawmakers from both parties on the relevant committees had 
been briefed on the deal .... [T]here had been numerous contacts 
with the administration."269 Charles Schumer, a Senator from New 
York who had been a vocal opponent of the DP World transaction, 
found two differences between the Doncasters takeover and the 
previous failed DP World transaction. Schumer stated that "this 
went through the process in a careful, thoughtful way and, second, 
this is a product, not a service, and the opportunity to infiltrate and 
sabotage is both more difficult and more detectable."27o Apparently 
some tweaking of the process was at work in the approval of this 
deal as lawmakers felt they were kept informed of the progress of 
the CFIUS review. Lawmakers also apparently believed that a 
company that provided products was more controllable than one 
that provided services. 
But perhaps a third factor was also at work. Perhaps legislators 
realized that they needed to tone down the rhetoric or face the risk 
of alienating potential allies in the war on terror. While the CFIUS 
review of the Doncasters takeover was pending, a former senior 
intelligence official suggested that Congress should consider the 
possible implications for cooperation in intelligence gathering 
between Arab governments and the United States.271 Unwarranted 
congressional opposition could have reduced such cooperation.272 
President on April 13, 2006. See id. The President's fifteen-day timeframe to make a decision 
therefore expired on April 28, 2006. See id. 
266 Id. 
267 See id. 
268 Bush Approves Dubai Company Takeover, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 30, 2006, 
http://www.iht.comlarticles/2006/04/30fbusiness/web .0430dubai. php. 
269 Bush Backs Dubai Firm's Plant Operations, USAToDAY.COM, Apr. 28, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.comlnews/washingtonl2006-04-28-bush-dubai_x.htm. 
270 Joseph Curl, Bush Approves Defense Contract for Dubai Firm, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2006, at A02 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
271 See Demetri Sevastopulo & Stephanie Kirchgaessner, US to Investigate Second Dubai 
Deal, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.ft.comlcms/sfb54633ca-aa48-11da-96ea-
000077ge2340.html. 
272 John McLaughlin, former Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated 
that the United States "had had a very good intelligence relationship with the UAE since the 
2001 attacks on the US." Id. However, the same article points out that another former senior 
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Pro-Western sentiment in Dubai had apparently changed to 
bitterness after the negative views of Arabs and Islam that were 
exposed in the rejection of the DP World dea1.273 Congressional 
opposition to a foreign takeover should be based on real threats, not 
on opportunities for posturing. Fear of terrorism must not be the 
controlling criterion for judging a foreign investment transaction. 
Failing to achieve a balance between the neutral and the 
emotional views threatens a fourth backlash-cynicism and 
distrust. The publisher of Harper's Magazine described the 
Democratic Party's reaction to the DP World transaction as a "cash-
in on 'Portgate,'" finding the controversy "replete with irony" since 
neither party had cared much about port security earlier.274 While 
Senator Hillary Clinton sounded alarms, former President Bill 
Clinton had advised Dubai on how to handle the situation.275 On 
the Republican side, President Bush exhibited an "aggressive, 
rapid-action defense of the ports' purchasers."276 Ironically, 
"[President Bush's] slow-motion response to Hurricane Katrina 
[was] so striking that it made you wonder what's so urgently 
important about the deal's [sic] going through."277 Responding to 
the political reaction against the transaction, DP World announced 
that it would sell its U.S. operations to a U.S. company.278 But in an 
interview, Simon Romero of the New York Times stated: 
[O]f the top eight terminal operations companies in the world 
that do ... this type of work at ... big international ports, 
only one is American. And that company is based out of 
Seattle. It is called SSA Marine. It is a family-owned 
company. But it's not nearly of the same scale as ... Dubai 
Ports World or its competitor in bid for ... P&O, which was a 
company that was controlled by Singapore's government. 279 
intelligence official disputed this statement. See id. 
273 Samuelson, supra note 251, at 33 (reporting on the increased bitterness in Dubai, 
primarily as a result of perceived racism). 
274 John R. MacArthur, UAE Paymaster for Bushes and Clinton, HARPER'S, Mar. 8, 2006, 
http://www.harpers.orgIUAEPaymaster.html ("[Tlhe leadership of both parties supported the 
Clinton·backed 'free· trade' agreement in 2000 with China, which caused a huge increase in 




278 E.g., Jonathan Weisman & Bradley Graham, Dubai Firm to Sell U.S. Port Operations, 
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279 Interview by Margaret Warner with Simon Romero, Bus. Reporter, N.Y. Times, in 
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Following up, Norman Ornstein, a congressional watcher for the 
American Enterprise Institute, said that the Bush Administration 
ha[s] got a dilemma now, because there simply aren't 
American companies that have the know-how and the 
breadth to do this. Interestingly, and perhaps ironically, 
what I had heard earlier in the day, as they were looking at 
those that have the ... kind of resources, Halliburton was a 
name that came up. And Democrats, I'm sure, are saying, 
please, God, let that happen.28o 
This reference to the company that Vice President Dick Cheney 
led during the 1990s suggests that many would see the whole deal 
as a vehicle for the amassing of private wealth at the public's 
expense. 
Distrust is also a problem. In response to the DP World 
transaction, DIMP held a hearing on April 27, 2006 to evaluate the 
CFIUS process.281 In the opinion of an invited speaker, Georgetown 
Law Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, the "most important development 
framing the terms of current debate over the CFIUS process - the 
development that hard] led to your hearings in March and today 
[was that] Congress hard] obviously lost confidence in the 
Administration's handling of Section 721 cases."282 The loss of 
confidence stemmed largely because "the public still d[id] not have a 
complete explanation of the Administration's decision not to take 
action."283 In discussing the requirement that CFIUS protect 
sensitive information, Tarullo stressed the need for communication 
between the Executive and the public. According to Tarullo: 
[P]articularly in light of the current emphasis upon 
homeland security, the American public deserves to know 
what approach to national security reviews CFIUS has 
taken. As the DP World situation made abundantly clear, in 
the current environment if the Administration does not 
adequately explain its actions, Congress, the press, and the 
public will draw their own conclusions - without the benefit 
companies are capable of buying and running port operations). 
280 Interview by Margaret Warner with Norman Ornstein, Am. Enter. Inst. (Mar. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/transportationljan-june061hls-ports_3-9.html. 
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of full information. 284 
Lacking information, Congress, while championing a transaction 
that seemed counterintuitive to homeland security, concluded that 
the President was not protecting the nation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The clash of these three imperatives-economic welfare, national 
security, and the new super-national security-is probably 
inevitable. The elected members of Congress must respond to the 
perceived absurdity of inviting into the nation's ports a company 
associated in the public mind with terrorism. The members of 
CFIUS must respond to the facts and figures that say a company's 
transaction will not affect national security. The President is 
entitled to defend decisions that he believes do not pose threats. 
In the DP World uproar, all three actors must be criticized. 
Although CFIUS review was set up to be sufficiently rigorous to 
distinguish between run-of-the-mill transactions and those that 
genuinely warrant blockage on national security grounds, that 
review might not have been rigorous enough in this case. A 
Treasury Department press release stressed that CFIUS members 
did not agree to the DP World transaction until "roughly 90 days 
after the parties to the transaction first approached CFIUS about 
the transaction and roughly 75 days after a thorough investigation 
of the transaction had begun."285 If the goal of this statement was to 
justify not conducting the forty-five-day review, it failed. The 
statute does not allow for CFIUS to choose when it will follow the 
statute. The mandate is clear in stating that "[t]he President or the 
President's designee shall make aD [forty-five-day] investigation" 
when a transaction involves "an entity controlled by or acting on 
behalf of a foreign government."286 Failure to follow the mandate 
suggests the possibility of complacency in this review--complacency 
that is not acceptable where a transaction exposed the raw nerves of 
9/11.287 CFIUS must follow the requirements set out in Exon-Florio. 
284 Id. at 8-9. 
285 CFIUS and the Protection of National Security, supra note 203. 
286 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (2000). 
287 According to Media Matters for America, failing to conduct the forty· five-day review was 
not the only problem with how the DP World transaction was handled. See Wall Street 
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MATTERS FOR AM., Mar. 6, 2006, http://mediamatters.org/items/200603060003. Articles in the 
Wall Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times "omitted the ... fact that [CFIUSj ... opted 
not to conduct such an investigation when it first reviewed the deal. Moreover, both articles 
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Further, CFIUS must communicate with Congress. CFIUS has to 
protect proprietary business information that is revealed during 
ongoing reviews. However, CFIUS should be able to provide 
Congress with information about completed reviews. As Professor 
Tarullo pointed out during his testimony at the DIMP hearing on 
CFIUS, if the Government Accounting Office is able to issue reports 
about CFIUS without violating confidentiality, as it has in response 
to congressional inquiries, so should CFIUS itself.288 
With respect to transactions that have been agreed to, CFIUS 
should let Congress know what agreements have been negotiated 
with the acquiring company so that Congress can track the 
implementation of these agreements. For example, in 1995, 
Chinese company San Huan wanted to purchase Magnequench, a 
General Motors company located in Indiana that made "rare-earth 
magnets used in guidance systems of smart bombs."289 San Huan 
wanted to acquire Magnequench because it had "the best 
technology, biggest production capability and [the] sole patent for" 
the special powder needed to manufacture the magnets.290 After 
CFIUS approved the deal, San Huan opened a plant in Tianjin, 
China, closer to its source of raw materials.291 It then shut down 
the U.S. facilities. 292 The open question was whether this move 
would result in a national security problem. Dr. Peter Leitner, an 
adviser to the Department of Defense, has said that "[t]he Chinese 
are clearly trying to monopolize the world supply of rare-earth 
materials ... that are essential to the production of the militarily 
critical magnets."293 On the other hand, Walter Benecki, a 
consultant for the magnetics industry, does not see possible market 
domination by China as "conspiratorial," but "just the natural 
evolution of technology and manufacturing," in response to which 
quoted members of Congress criticizing the deal ... failed to note that ... these congressional 
members asserted that the Bush administration was legally required to conduct a 45·day 
investigation." Id. The implication is that the press, or at least some particular papers, may 
have been trying to help the embattled Administration in its defense of CFIUS approval of the 
DP World deal by not telling the public that the Committee omitted a required step in the 
review process. See id. 
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"[c]ompanies must establish some sort of China capability to remain 
profitable."294 The point is that Congress needs information from 
CFIUS to fulfill its oversight role. Congress might have stopped the 
closure of the Indiana facility if it had full information. 
Congress is not blameless in the DP World story either. 
Congressional response to the deal has been described as "a free-for-
all on Capitol Hill," involving members of both parties.295 
Congress should refrain from changing Exon-Florio without 
careful thought. In particular, Congress should not require CFIUS 
to make protection of specific industries a factor. First, the drafters 
of the regulations considered and rejected this approach originally. 
They considered lists of industries and multifactor tests that might 
be applied to determine if particular industries belong on or off the 
list; at the same time they limited the authority of the President to 
protect national security. Such protection of specific industries may 
also have the effect of driving away foreign investment in related 
industries and in general. Congress should not incorporate longer 
timeframes than already exist. Unless CFIUS itself indicates that 
longer timeframes are necessary, the longer a proposed transaction 
is kept open, the greater the uncertainty and risk for the parties. 
Congress should not bar foreign ownership of U.S. companies as 
Duncan Hunter has called for.296 CFIUS review works effectively 
now on a case-by-case basis to exclude risky transactions. Barring 
foreign ownership would unnecessarily deny us potentially 
advantageous opportunities for partnership. It could lead to closing 
the door to U.S. companies that wish to enter transactions with 
companies abroad. 
Neither does the Administration deserve credit in this affair. The 
President's strident championing of the deal struck a sour note with 
both Congress and the public alike. It may be beyond human 
nature for elected members of Congress not to strut about in the 
peacock feathers of righteous indignation. It falls to the President 
to communicate more effectively if CFIUS review suggests that the 
transaction will not have homeland security risks. If the review 
process seems to ignore the dominant fears that drive society at any 
294 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
295 Samuelson, supra note 251, at 33. Furthermore, Samuelson writes that "[als political 
theater, the posturing might be harmless. But all the grandstanding--precisely because the 
criticisms were overblown--damages American interests. It's a public-relations disaster in the 
Middle East .... Much bitterness is reported in Dubai, especially among those who are pro-
Western." Id. 
296 See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
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particular time, the recommendation to go forward in certain 
transactions will startle and confound the public. When these 
recommended transactions are then undone after-the-fact, the 
Administration loses face, the affected foreign companies are 
insulted, and everyone involved in the transaction loses time and 
money. 
President Reagan's worry about Exon-Florio was that it would 
create a public climate or a bureaucratic disposition to hinder 
foreign investors.297 That has not happened. If the review process 
had been correctly implemented by CFIUS, not improperly bashed 
by Congress, and reasonably explained by the President, the CFIUS 
review of the DP World transaction would have been nothing more 
than a tempest in seaport. 
297 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
